1. 07 Nov, 2011 1 commit
    • Ondřej Zajíček's avatar
      Implements protocol templates. · a7f23f58
      Ondřej Zajíček authored
      Based on the patch from Alexander V. Chernikov.
      Extended to support almost all protocols.
      Uses 'protocol bgp NAME from TEMPLATE { ... }' syntax.
      a7f23f58
  2. 03 Sep, 2011 1 commit
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  8. 28 Dec, 2010 1 commit
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  12. 13 Nov, 2010 1 commit
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  15. 24 Apr, 2010 1 commit
    • Ondřej Zajíček's avatar
      Fixes and enhancements in 'show ospf state' command. · 0ea8fb4a
      Ondřej Zajíček authored
      Now it shows a distance, option to change showing reachable/all network
      nodes and better handling of AS-external LSAs in multiple areas. The
      command 'show ospf topology' was changed to not show stubnets in both
      OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 (previously it displayed stubnets in OSPFv2).
      0ea8fb4a
  16. 26 Mar, 2010 2 commits
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  32. 11 Jun, 2009 1 commit
  33. 10 Jun, 2009 1 commit
  34. 08 Apr, 2009 1 commit
    • Ondřej Zajíček's avatar
      Fixes broken cryptographic authentication in OSPF · 024c310b
      Ondřej Zajíček authored
      Cryptographic authentication in OSPF is defective by
      design - there might be several packets independently
      sent to the network (for example HELLO, LSUPD and LSACK)
      where they might be reordered and that causes crypt.
      sequence number error.
      
      That can be workarounded by not incresing sequence number
      too often. Now we update it only when last packet was sent
      before at least one second. This can constitute a risk of
      replay attacks, but RFC supposes something similar (like time
      in seconds used as CSN).
      024c310b
  35. 06 Apr, 2009 1 commit